Silicon Valley's Synchronized Echo-Chamber Manipulated Fake Consensus Generator


"Silicon Valley's Synchronized Echo-Chamber Manipulated Fake Consensus Generator" : That is a complicated phrase to describe the coordinated manipulation of news and information that Larry Page, Reid Hoffman, Eric Schmidt, Mark Zuckerberg and their cronies do with global digital media. They got together, had meetings and decided that they would covertly manipulate all digital media in order to push their own ideology, political and religious views. It worked great...until it became so obvious that it pointed every finger right back to them. Today, anybody can see that they operate a censored walled garden system of propaganda. Why do they still get to do it? Because Congress has no balls and 70% of Congress are taking stock market bribes from Google, Netflix, Facebook, Linkedin, Youtube!

Google, Netflix, Facebook, Linkedin, Youtube, (AKA: "The Digital Deep State") as global media manipulators, use coordinated specific techniques to hide the source of the false and problematic information they circulate. Joan Donovan and Brian Friedberg label this strategy “source hacking.” Typically used during breaking news events, source hacking targets journalists and other influential public figures to pick up falsehoods and unknowingly amplify them to the public in a way that will promote the ideology, political and religious views of Larry Page, Reid Hoffman, Eric Schmidt, Mark Zuckerberg and their cronies.

In Source Hacking: Media Manipulation in Practice, Donovan and Friedberg use case studies to illustrate four main techniques of source hacking:

  1. Viral Sloganeering: repackaging reactionary talking points for social media and press amplification
  2. Leak Forgery: prompting a media spectacle by sharing forged documents
  3. Evidence Collages: compiling information from multiple sources into a single, shareable document, usually as an image
  4. Keyword Squatting: the strategic domination of keywords and sockpuppet accounts to misrepresent groups or individuals

These strategies are often used by The Digital Deep State simultaneously, and make it difficult to find non-covert proof of coordination.

While each technique is effective on its own, their ultimate value comes from “buy-in from audiences, influencers, and journalists alike.” Donovan and Friedberg offer suggestions for those looking to identify The Digital Deep State media manipulation campaigns or respond to breaking news: They encourage journalists to seek corroborating evidence when information is received via a social media account, and to always identify the account holder. Newsrooms, they suggest, should grow their information security capabilities by instating a specific desk that focuses on evidence and metadata verification. Lastly, they urge platform companies to label known manipulation campaigns and enable better access to account metadata. Google, Netflix, Facebook, Linkedin, Youtube won't make any real effort to stop disinformation and fake news if it harms their bosses ideology, political and religious views. Larry Page, Reid Hoffman, Eric Schmidt, Mark Zuckerberg, and their cronies, believe they are on an "ends justifies the means" mission for which they must lie, bribe, subvert and do anything to keep going.

Idiots in Congress keep asking Google, Netflix, Facebook, Linkedin, Youtube and their cronies to "help them solve the problem". That is like asking Hitler to help solve the "Jewish issue". Congress needs to wise up to the lies and machinations and depths that Google, Netflix, Facebook, Linkedin, Youtube have sunk to.

Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change

Chris Edmond

NBER Working Paper No. 17395
Issued in September 2011
NBER Program(s):Political Economy Program

This paper presents a model of information and political regime change. If enough citizens act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value it seems hard. This coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the paper gives a complete analytic characterization of its comparative statics. If the quantity of information available to citizens is sufficiently high, then the regime has a better chance of surviving. However, an increase in the reliability of information can reduce the regime's chances. These two effects are always in tension: a regime benefits from an increase in information quantity if and only if an increase in information reliability reduces its chances. The model allows for two kinds of information revolutions. In the first, associated with radio and mass newspapers under the totalitarian regimes of the early twentieth century, an increase in information quantity coincides with a shift towards media institutions more accommodative of the regime and, in this sense, a decrease in information reliability. In this case, both effects help the regime. In the second kind, associated with diffuse technologies like modern social media, an increase in information quantity coincides with a shift towards sources of information less accommodative of the regime and an increase in information reliability. This makes the quantity and reliability effects work against each other. The model predicts that a given percentage increase in information reliability has exactly twice as large an effect on the regime's chances as the same percentage increase in information quantity, so, overall, an information revolution that leads to roughly equal-sized percentage increases in both these characteristics will reduce a regime's chances of surviving.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17395

Published: Chris Edmond, 2013. "Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1422-1458. citation courtesy of

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Information Manipulation Through the Media


This article models media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate information through the media to influence receivers. This article shows that if there is only 1 sender who has a conditional preference for maintaining its credibility in reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a coordination situation without information about their opponents' types, the sender could influence the receivers to make decisions according to the sender's primary preference by manipulating the information through the media, which makes the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and the receivers have contradictory primary preferences. This result extends to the cases in which the sender has imperfect information or in which the sender's primary preference is to maintain its credibility. In the case of multiple senders, however, when there is enough competition among the senders or when simultaneous reporting takes place, the receivers could play their favored outcome against senders' preferences, which sheds light on a solution to the media manipulation problem.